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ABSTRACT
In most European countries, the prevailing terms of employment, including the nominal wage,
can only be changed by mutual consent. I show that this feature implies that workers have a strategic
advantage in the wage negotiations when they try to prevent a cut in nominal wages. If inflation is so low
that some nominal wages have to be cut, the strategic advantage of the workers’ induces higher
unemployment in equilibrium. The upshot is a long run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment
for low levels of inflation. The prediction that low inflation involves higher unemployment in Europe but









In recent years, a number of countries have adopted explicit inflation targets for monetary 
policy, reflecting a general agreement that monetary policy must ensure low inflation. 
Yet several economists have argued that if policy aims at too low inflation, downward 
rigidity of nominal wages may lead to higher wage pressure, involving higher 
equilibrium unemployment (eg Tobin, 1972, Holden, 1994, and Akerlof, Dickens and 
Perry, 1996, 2000).
1 This latter view has been strengthened by the increasing body of 
evidence documenting downward nominal wage rigidity in many OECD countries (see 
references in section 7). However, against this view, sceptics have argued that any 
downward rigidity that may exist is the result of an inflationary environment, and that 
society will adapt to a zero inflation policy without large and persistent impact on output 
and employment (Ball and Mankiw, 1994, Gordon, 1996).  
A problem when evaluating these two opposing views is that there is no generally 
accepted explanation for why nominal wages may be rigid downwards. In this paper I 
argue that the institutional framework of the wage setting crucially affects the existence 
and importance of downward nominal wage rigidity. More specifically, I argue that the 
extent of downward nominal wage rigidity, and the unemployment costs associated with 
very low inflation that this involves, are related to three key factors: the coverage of 
collective agreements, the legal framework at renegotiations of collective agreements, 
and the strictness of the employment protection legislation for non-union workers. The 
key underlying idea is that employment contracts typically have a fixed nominal wage 
                                                 
1 Low inflation may also limit the scope for expansionary monetary policy as the nominal 
interest rate cannot be negative, cf Keynes (1936). 
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that is renegotiable only by mutual consent (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993, Holden, 
1994). In many cases the practical importance of this legal requirement is negligible. For 
example, in the US labour market the standard presumption is that employment is at-will, 
the legal interpretation in effect being that the employer unilaterally can cut nominal 
wages (Malcomson, 1997). However, in other countries, and in particular in collective 
wage setting, the legal requirement of mutual consent is more important. I show that this 
requirement implies that workers/unions have a strategic advantage in the wage setting 
when they try to prevent a nominal wage cut. If inflation is so low that employers want to 
cut nominal wages, this strategic advantage leads to stronger wage pressure and higher 
unemployment in equilibrium. The upshot is the existence of a long run tradeoff between 
unemployment and inflation.  
The basic theoretical framework draws heavily on Holden (1994), but extending 
the analysis in several ways. Most importantly, I include a non-union sector, allowing for 
an investigation of the causes of nominal wage rigidity outside the union sector, as well 
as for comparisons between countries with different degrees of unionisation. 
Furthermore, I explore the model numerically, in an extended version allowing for 
productivity growth, changes in relative wages and non-strike industrial action.  
Other recent explanations of downward nominal wage rigidity have generally 
appealed to money illusion or fairness considerations, ie that workers view a cut in 
nominal wages as unfair. I do not wish to contend the existence of such effects (cf 
documentation in eg Shafir, Diamond and Tversky, 1997, and Bewley, 1999). Rather, I 
think that fairness considerations and legal effects may re-enforce each other. However, 
understanding the reasons for downward nominal wage rigidity seems crucial in   4
evaluating their effects and assessing to what extent rigidities may disappear in a zero 
inflation economy.  
The idea of the present paper is very different from the literature on overlapping 
wage contracts of Taylor (1979), both when it comes to theoretical explanation and 
empirical implications. In the present model, persistent nominal rigidity linking 
consecutive contract periods is explained without staggering of wage contracts. 
Furthermore, the long-run Phillips curve has downward-sloping parts, in contrast to the 
vertical long run Phillips curve in the overlapping contracts literature.  
The argument of the paper has important implications for the inflation target that 
monetary policy should aim at. In countries with high bargaining coverage and regulated 
labour markets, aiming at very low inflation may involve considerable costs in the form 
of higher unemployment and reduced output. In contrast, in countries with low 
bargaining coverage and weak employment protection legislation, aiming at low inflation 
is likely to have a much smaller impact on unemployment. This contention is consistent 
with the empirical findings of Bullard and Keating (1995) for the period 1960-90. They 
find that a negative and significant long-run response of output to a reduction in inflation 
in European countries with low inflation (Germany, Austria, Finland and the UK), but 
they do not find a similar relationship in the US. Note, however, that I do not aim at 
finding the optimal rate of inflation - inflation clearly also involves important costs, 
associated with among other things increased uncertainty, reduced money holdings and 
capital taxation, all of which are neglected in the present paper (see eg Feldstein, 1997). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I present 
important institutional features of the wage setting in Western Europe and the US. The   5
basic model is provided in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 derives the equilibrium of the 
model. Numerical simulations are presented in section 6. In section 7, I discuss available 
empirical evidence. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix. 
2  Nominal rigidity in the wage setting process
2 
The crucial assumption in the model, and the source of the nominal rigidity, is that the 
nominal wage of the old contract affects the parties’ disagreement point in the wage 
bargaining. This section substantiates this assumption by describing the relevant aspects 
of the wage setting systems in many Western European countries and the US.  
Most workers in Europe are hired in permanent jobs. The general principle is then 
that the prevailing terms of employment are interpreted as a legal contract, and may as 
such only be changed by mutual consent. To reduce wages, the employer must persuade 
the employee to accept the wage cut. One possibility is to threaten to lay off the 
employee temporarily or permanently unless he accepts a wage cut. In principle, the 
employer can terminate the employment contract and offer a new contract with lower 
pay. However, in some countries, courts may interpret a job offer at lower pay as 
evidence that the initial dismissal was unwarranted, unless the wage reduction could be 
justified by the economic situation of the firm. In countries with weak employment 
protection legislation, like the UK, enforcing a cut in nominal wages is likely to be more 
feasible than in countries with stricter employment protection legislation, like Germany, 
Italy and Sweden. 
                                                 
2 This section draws upon the country chapters in Blanpain (1994) and private 
communications with Stein Evju.   6
  For workers covered by collective agreements, ie the large majority of employees 
in Western Europe,
3 additional issues arise. The wage regulations in collective 
agreements are usually of finite duration. However, when this period has expired, the 
employer may nevertheless not lawfully unilaterally change the terms of the agreement. 
Unless a work stoppage has been initiated, it is in most countries a well established 
practice that production continues under the terms of the old agreement until a new 
agreement is reached, even after the old agreement has expired (holdout). 
  Again, the employer has a variety of measures that can be used to persuade or 
threaten unions/workers to accept a nominal wage cut. Workers can be laid off 
temporarily or permanently, possibly in connection with a plant closure, or the firm can 
use lock-out. Alternatively, the employer can unilaterally terminate the collective 
agreement, following specific, often time-consuming, legal procedures. However, this 
may involve costs, as the agreement also regulates work. Furthermore, in many countries 
the terms of the agreement are in this event considered to be included in the individual 
employment contracts. Thus, a wage cut still requires consent by the employees. 
In many cases, the remuneration also consists of more "flexible" parts, like bonus 
schemes and fringe benefits. This may give the employer some scope for reducing pay 
even within the existing contract. I address this issue in the formal model. For now, 
observe that while annual fluctuations in the factors that these forms of remuneration 
depend on may lead to annual fluctuations in pay, there may still be contractual and 
labour regulations that severely restrict employers' scope of reducing remuneration at 
                                                 
3 In most Western European countries, bargaining coverage in the market sector is about 
70-80 percent, with Denmark (52), Switzerland (50), UK (35) and Ireland as notable 
exceptions, see (Calmfors et al, 2001) table 4.4.   7
will. Lebow, Saks and Wilson (2000) show that US firms are able to circumvent some, 
but not all the wage rigidity by varying benefits. 
In the US, there are much less restrictions on employers’ possibility of 
unilaterally cutting the wage. For individual workers, the basic presumption is that 
employment is at will, implying that either party may terminate the employment 
relationship for any reason, or for no reason at all. Furthermore, if the employer 
announces a wage cut, the employee's continuance in service is considered to constitute 
acceptance, in contrast to the situation in Europe (Malcomson, 1997). However, in parts 
of the labour market, contracts or specific circumstances may prevent employment-at-
will, making it more difficult for the employer to cut wages.  
The institutional feature that prevents employers from unilaterally cutting nominal 
wages can be seen as a consequence of standard contract law, which generally holds that 
a contract between two parties can only be changed by mutual consent. This feature may 
play an important role in inducing efficient levels of investment, by preventing one player 
from reaping the return of the investment of the other by demanding a renegotiation of 
the contract (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993, and Holden,1999).  
3 The  model 
We consider a standard monopolistic competition economy, consisting of a large number 
K symmetric firms, each producing a different good (alternatively, firms may be thought 
of as industries, each consisting of several firms that produce an identical product under 
Bertrand competition). A share γ of the economy is unionised, with one union in each 
firm, each with 1/K members. In these firms, the wage is set in a bargain between union   8
and firm. The remaining share 1 - γ is non-unionised, and the wage is set in an individual 
bargain between the worker and the firm.  
The model considers one contract period; however, there is a nominal wage 
contract from the previous contract period, W
U
-1 in all unionised firms, and W
N
-1 in non-
unionised firms, consistent with the large empirical prevalence of nominal contracts (see 
Gottfries, 1992, for a possible explanation). Note that this does not rule out indexation at 
specific dates: For example, at the expiration of a two-year contract, the wage is given in 
nominal terms even if there has been indexation after one year of the contract. 
  For modelling purposes related to the wage setting, the contract period is divided 
into an infinite number of short time spans. In each such time span, a small fraction s of 
the labour force leaves the work force (“retires”), and is replaced by identical workers 
entering as unemployed.  
At the immediate beginning of the contract period, the following events take 
place. First, the central bank CB sets the total money stock M > 0. Second, wages are set 
simultaneously in each firm. Third, each firm sets the price and employment levels.  
All agents are fully aware of how the economy works, so they can predict what other 
agents will do at the same and later stages of the model. As agents are small, they treat 
the aggregate variables as exogenous. 
  Observe that in contrast to the literature on overlapping nominal contracts, wage 
and subsequently price setting are simultaneous in each firm, with perfect knowledge 
about the monetary policy. Thus, the effects of monetary policy in equilibrium should be 
interpreted as long run effects that are not based on expectational errors.   9
  Each firm j has a constant returns to scale production function Yj = Nj, where Yj is 
output and Nj is employment. In principle, Yj and Nj (as well as the other flow variables) 
may vary from time span to time span, however, in equilibrium they will be constant, and 
for notational simplicity I do not index time span. The real profits of the firm are 
 
(1) Πj = (PjYj –WjNj)/P, 
 
where Pj is the price of output, Wj is the nominal wage in firm j, and 
(2)  
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4  
 
The union cares about employment and the pay relative to workers' alternative income:  
 
(4) Uj = (Wj/P– R)
φNj
1-φ    0 < φ < 1, 
 
where Wj/P is the real wage, R is workers' alternative income and the parameter φ 
measures unions' concern for employment relative to income. The alternative income R is 
                                                 
4 As is well known, (3) can be derived in an optimising framework of Dixit-Stiglitz type, 
with households with CES utility functions defined over consumption and holdings of 
real money stock, where η is a parameter in the utility function. 
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based on the assumption that workers not hired in this firm will initially be unemployed, 
with payoff B > 0 (the value of leisure or non-market income), but they have the 
opportunity of finding a new job as new hirings occur to replace the “retirees”, at an 
expected wage equal to the average real wage of the economy; specifically,  
 
(5)  () (, ) 1 () () () 1 , ' () 0
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where the aggregate rate of unemployment u ≡ 1 - N (total labour supply is normalized to 
unity, and N = Σj Nj is aggregate employment). The function σ captures in a crude fashion 
that the probability of obtaining a new job is increasing in, and lower than, the aggregate 
employment rate (see Layard et al, 1991, page 101 for a more detailed discussion). The 
specific functional forms (1)-(6) are chosen for tractability and notational simplicity but 
not important for the qualitative results.  
Equilibrium in this model is a situation where, for given values of M and W
U
 -1 and 
W
N
 –1, there is Nash equilibrium in prices in stage 3, and wages are given by a subgame 
perfect equilibrium SPE in the wage setting in stage 2. To find the equilibrium, we start 
by analysing stage 3. The first order condition of the profit maximization problem is 
 
(7) Pj = νWj,      where  ν = η/(η-1) > 1. 
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As profits are concave in Pj, the first-order condition (7) is sufficient to ensure a unique 
maximum, constituting Nash equilibrium in the price setting game. Substituting out, we 
obtain the labour demand, as well as the indirect payoff functions of the unions and firms 
 
(8) Nj = (νWj/P)
-η(M/P)/K 
(9) Πj  =  Π( Wj/P, M/P) = (ν-1)(Wj/P)
1-ην
-η (M/P)/K, 





4  The wage setting 
We first consider wage setting in the unionised part of the economy. The standard 
approach in models of union bargaining, eg Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), is to 
employ the Nash bargaining solution, where the disagreement points are specified as 
players' payoffs during a strike. Under this assumption, the wage of the old nominal 
contract is irrelevant, as it does not affect the strike payoffs. However, specifying the 
disagreement points as players’ utility during a strike is a valid assumption only if a strike 
is an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement in the bargaining. This 
is clearly not the case; there is no strike unless the union initiates it. In many countries it 
happens frequently that the old contract expires before a new agreement is reached, and 
without a strike being initiated (see evidence in Cramton and Tracy, 1992, and van Ours 
and van de Wijngaert, 1992). In this case production continues under the terms of the old 
contract while the parties are bargaining (holdout). To allow for holdouts, and 
endogenising the strike and lockout decisions, I adopt an extension of the Rubinstein 
(1982) model similar to Holden (1994,1999), cf Figure 1. 
The first two steps of the bargaining game, which take place in negligible time,   12
determine which type of dispute (strike, lockout or holdout) prevails in the bargaining. At 
the third step, a standard Rubinstein bargaining game starts, where players alternate in 
making offers, one offer per time span. In each of the first two steps, one of the players 
makes an offer, which the opponent may accept (thus ending the bargaining) or reject. 
Upon a rejection, the rejecting player may decide whether to initiate a work stoppage. As 
a convention, players do not initiate a work stoppage if they can get the same payoff 
under the existing contract. 
If a work stoppage (ie strike or lock-out) has been initiated in step one or two, 
both parties receive (for simplicity) zero payoffs from step 3 on, until a new agreement is 
reached. A key assumption is that if a work stoppage takes place, it always involves non-
negligible costs to the parties (fixed costs; Holden, 1994). These costs may be given 
several different interpretations. In the UK, where unions are required to keep a ballot, 
the costs of arranging the ballot would be part of such costs. These costs may also arise if 
there is a minimum time before work can be resumed after a work stoppage. Furthermore, 
if the model is extended to allow for risk aversion and uncertainty as to the payoffs 
during a conflict, so that initiating a work stoppage involves a non-negligible probability 
of a lengthy conflict, and/or the wage outcome is uncertain, the fixed costs may be 
interpreted as the amount that the parties are willing to give up so as to avoid risk 
(Holden, 1999). Formally, when production is resumed after a work stoppage, the payoffs 
are λ
FΠ(Wj/P, M/P) and λ
UU(Wj/P, R, M/P), where 0 < λ
F,λ
U < 1. (The exact way in 
which these costs enter does not affect the qualitative results.) 
If none of the parties has initiated a work stoppage, there will be a holdout from 
step 3 on. During a holdout, parties are bound to observe the details of the old contract.   13
However, the contract is rarely so specific that it completely determines the parties’ 
payoffs. Workers may reduce profits by use of a variety of different industrial actions 
(see eg Blanpain, 1994), for example by strictly adhering to the working rules (work-to-
rule). The remuneration of the workers may also consist of some elements that are at the 
discretion of management, which may be reduced even under the existing contract. 
Formally, the payoffs during a holdout are (1-τ)Π (W
U
-1/P, M/P) and   
(1-ε)U(W
U
-1/P, R, M/P), where τ and ε are parameters satisfying 0 < τ,ε < 1, reflecting 
that a holdout is costly. Note that the value of old nominal contract is deflated by the new 
price level; when analysing the consequences of a deviation from equilibrium in one firm, 
I take as given equilibrium behaviour in other firms, involving immediate agreement in 
the wage bargain, with subsequent price setting.  
The SPE outcome if holdout threats are used in step 3 is on the form (cf appendix)
5  
 
(11)  W/P = (1+κ)W
U
-1/P, where  κ = (τ-ε)/2. 
The wage of the old contract affects the bargaining outcome because it determines 
players' payoffs during a conflict in the bargaining. (11) allows for a simple 
interpretation: A holdout leads to higher nominal wages (κ > 0) if and only if a holdout is 
more costly to the firm than to the union, ie. τ > ε (this is the common assumption in the 
literature, cf Moene, 1988, Holden, 1989, 1997, and Cramton and Tracy, 1992). 
  In equilibrium, an agreement will be reached in step 1 or 2, and there will be no 
costly dispute. In the appendix, I show the following Proposition. 
                                                 
5 For analytical tractability, (11) is derived by use of linear approximations to the true 
payoff functions. The qualitative results hold even without using the linear 
approximation, but the simple and easily interpretable form of (11) would be lost.    14
Proposition 1 
There exist two critical values k
L > k
S > 1, associated with respectively, lock-out and 
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Proposition 1 entails that either player can always ensure the payoff that he would have 
obtained by initiating a work stoppage – the union can ensure k
SR and the firm can push 
the union down to k
LR. If an holdout involves a lower payoff to one of the players than 
he would have gotten from a initiating a work stoppage ((1+κ)W
U
-1/P is outside the 
interval [k
SR, k
LR]), this player can credibly threaten to initiate a work stoppage. The 
opponent will then concede to a new agreement that gives the threatening player the 
payoff he would have gotten if work had been stopped.
6 However, if (1+κ)W
U
-1/P is 
within the interval [k
SR, k
LR], no player can credible threaten to stop work (case (ii)), 
because both parties lose from actually stopping work. Bargaining is undertaken under 
holdout threats, as discussed in relation to equation (11) above.  
One way to view this is that the player who wants to renegotiate the contract by 
use of work stoppage threats has a strategic disadvantage. To raise the wage above the 
outcome from a holdout, the union must threaten to call a costly strike, and the costs 
                                                 
6 From the derivation in appendix it is straightforward to show that k
L and k
S are 
decreasing in η and increasing in φ, implying that the standard feature that the bargaining 
outcome if strike or lock-out threats prevail is higher, the higher the profit of the firm and 
higher, the more concerned the union is about wages relative to employment.   15
associated with calling a strike weaken the potency of this threat. Correspondingly, the 
costs that the firm incurs by initiating a lock-out weaken the potency of lock-out threats. 
As the old contract may affect the bargaining outcome, the parties should ideally 
take into consideration that the bargaining outcome affects future wage negotiations. This 
is neglected in the present model. However, in Holden (1997), I analyse an infinite-
horizon version of a similar model, where agents take into consideration how the 
bargaining outcome in one period affects subsequent negotiations. There it is shown that 
this feature does not affect the qualitative results, only dampens the magnitudes. 
We then turn to wage setting in the non-unionised firms. Here, wages are set in 
an individual bargain between worker and firm. Again, as also assumed by MacLeod and 
Malcomson (1993), there is an existing nominal wage contract that can only be changed 
by mutual consent. However, in contrast to the collective bargaining case (and in contrast 
to the assumptions of MacLeod and Malcomson), it seems less relevant to allow players 
to stop work temporarily as a means of enforcing a change in the wage (ie. no strike or 
lockout). On the other hand, terminating the relationship permanently (quits or layoffs) is 
more relevant than under collective bargaining. If the firm decides to lay off the worker 
and recruit a new one, I assume that this involves an additional cost Z > 0. These costs 
include possible severance pay, legal costs, as well as the costs of hiring and training a 
new worker. Z is clearly increasing in workers' alternative income; for tractability, I 
assume a proportional relationship, ie Z = zR, where z > 0.
7  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 It would be realistic to assume that Z also depends on the situation of the firm, as to 
whether e.g. the firm wants to increase or reduce employment, but such issues are not 
well captured in a model which is essentially static. 
   16
In addition, I assume that there is a potential shirking problem, á lá Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984) (workers' effort is imperfectly monitored), so that the firm must ensure 
that the wage is sufficiently high that workers do not shirk. If a shirking worker is 
discovered and fired, he may expect to obtain workers' alternative income R. However, as 
the probability that a shirker is caught is less than one, the firm must pay more than the 
expected payoff if being fired. The analysis of this situation is straightforward but 
cumbersome, and to save space I just postulate a non-shirking constraint à là Shapiro-
Stiglitz (1984) that the wage must satisfy,  
 





E > 1. 
 
Formally, I consider a Rubinstein-type framework where players alternate in making 
offers. As long as the players are bargaining, both receive the payoff of the existing 
contract. However, whenever a player has rejected an offer, the player has the option of 
terminating the relationship permanently. The game thus constitutes a straightforward 
application of a standard Rubinstein game with outside options, and it follows directly 
using standard arguments that the outside option principle of Binmore, Shaked and 
Sutton (1989) applies: the outside options only affect the bargaining outcome if they are 
better than the “inside” alternative (in this case the payoff of the existing contract). 
(MacLeod and Malcomson derive a similar result; however, in their model the old 
contract can also be changed due to threats of stopping work.) Thus, if the real value of 
the old contract, W
N
-1/P, is below k
ER, firms will agree to raise the wage so as to avoid 
shirking. If the real value of the old contract is above k
ZR, where k
Z = k
E + z, firms may   17
credibly demand a wage reduction, because in this case it would be less costly to lay off 
the workers and hire a new one, than to pay the old contract. However, the firm will not 
be able to push the wage down below k





ZR, neither of the players can credibly demand a wage change, and the 
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5   The equilibrium 
We now turn to the equilibrium of the whole economy. For sake of comparison, we first 
consider an alternative legal regime, which essentially involves the standard assumptions 
in the literature. In the union sector, I assume exogenously that production cannot take 
place under the wage negotiations, ruling out the possibility of holdout. In this case the 
bargaining outcome is given by the Nash bargaining solution where both disagreement 
points are set to zero, irrespective of the wage of the old contract. As shown in the 
                                                 
8 As under union wage setting, one can show that if both parties can inflict a cost on the 






-1. One would expect that individual workers have a weaker position without 
unions, ie. κ > κ
N. κ
N may be positive or negative depending on the institutional 
framework, like the strictness of employment protection legislation, which provides the 
worker with scope for reducing effort without being fired. For simplicity, I set κ
N to zero. 
   18
appendix, the outcome can be written on the form W




S.  In 
the non-union sector, I assume that employment is at-will, so that the firm may 
essentially unilaterally set the wage. Furthermore, I neglect other possible costs 
associated with cutting the wage, like adverse effect on morale etc, in effect setting z = 0. 




   As explained in the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), in wage setting models 
the equilibrium can be derived by imposing that the real wage that comes out of the wage 
setting is consistent with the real wage implied by the price setting. Combining (2), (6) 
and (7), we find that the price setting implies that the aggregate real wage is a constant 
(because of constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of demand): W/P = 1/ν. As 




ER in (6). The 
requirement that wage and price setting be consistent thus implies that 
(13) 
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Substituting out for R using (5), and linearising σ(u) ≡ σu, where σ > 0, to obtain an 

















Observe that, here and below, the equilibrium rate of unemployment exhibits standard 
properties by being increasing in the markup of wages over workers' alternative income   19
(k
B and k
E), and in the payoff of the unemployed B relative to the average real wage 1/ν, 
and decreasing in the difficulty of finding a new job given the rate of unemployment (σ). 
The rest of the model then follows from straightforward substitution in the relevant 
equations (cf appendix), and the results are summarised in the following Proposition, 
involving the standard properties in the literature (as in Layard et al, 1991): 
 
Proposition 3 
In a legal regime where holdout is banned in the union sector, and employment at-will 
prevails in the non-union sector, the unique equilibrium rate of unemployment is u
B, 
given by (14). All nominal variables are homogenous of degree one in the nominal 
money stock, so that the size of the nominal money stock does not affect real variables.  
 
Then return to the main model of the paper. There are now several different types of 
equilibria, and as will become apparent below, the size of the nominal money stock 
relative to the nominal wage of the old contracts determines which type prevails. 
Consider first an equilibrium where strike threats are used in unionised firms, and the 
efficiency wage applies in the non-union sector. The equilibrium requirement that price 
setting is consistent with wage setting gives an equation of the same form as (13), which 
as above can be used to derive the equilibrium rate of unemployment  
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Comparing (15) and (14) shows that the only one difference between the standard regime 
and the strike regime is related to k
S < k
B, implying that u
S < u
B; the possibility of 
holdout actually weakens the potency of strike threats (cf. Proposition 1), thus mitigating 
wage pressure and reducing equilibrium unemployment.  
Then consider an equilibrium where lock-out and layoff threats apply in, respectively, 
union and non-union firms. As above, we can solve for equilibrium unemployment 
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Comparing (16), (15) and (14) shows that the lock-out equilibrium is associated with 
higher unemployment than both the strike equilibrium and the standard legal regime, u
L > 
u
B >  u
S. This follows from the fact that k
LZ > k
BE >  k
SE. Intuitively, firms are at a 
strategic disadvantage in a lock-out equilibrium: In the union sector, the costs associated 
with initiating a lockout imply that unions can demand a high markup on the alternative 
income (k
L > k
B); in the non-union sector, the costs of replacing a worker can be 
exploited by the incumbent worker to obtain a higher wage than would be given to a 
newcomer (k
Z > k
E), and both these features imply that a higher rate of unemployment is 
required in equilibrium. Proposition 4 shows that the monetary policy determines which 
regime prevails (proof in appendix). 
 
Proposition 4 
There is a trade-off between unemployment and inflation over a range of equilibrium 
rates of unemployment [u
S, u
L], where the outcome depends on the value of the nominal   21
money stock. Specifically, there exist critical values M
S and M












S > 0, such that  
(i)  If M > M
S, strike threats prevail in the union sector, efficiency wages in the 
non-union sector, inflation P/P-1 – 1 ≥ π
S, and the rate of unemployment, u = u
S. 
(ii) If  M  ∈ [M
L, M
S], holdout threats prevail in at least one sector, inflation P/P-1 -1 
∈ [π
L, π
S], and the rate of unemployment u ∈ [u
S, u
L]. 
(iii)  If M < M
L, lock-out threats prevail in the union sector, and layoff threats in the 
non-union sector, inflation P/P-1 -1 ≤ π
L, and the rate of unemployment, u = u
L. 
 
Proposition 4 entails important non-linearities between monetary policy, inflation and 
industrial action. In the low unemployment equilibrium, u = u
S, strike threats must prevail 
in the unionised sector, and efficiency wages in the non-union sector. As all unions can 
obtain a nominal wage (1+κ)W
U
-1
 by a holdout, strike threats must give at least this wage, 
and this puts a lower bound on the rate of inflation. Specifically, if money growth is 
sufficiently high to involve inflation greater than π
S, (which is equivalent to M > M
S), the 
economy will be in the “strike” regime. 
Likewise, the high unemployment equilibrium, u = u
L, is associated with lock-out 
threats in union firms, and the layoff case in non-union firms. Firms can credibly cut 
wages from the level associated with the old contract, which will happen if money 
growth is so low that inflation is below π
L, ie that M < M
L.  
For intermediate levels of the money stock, M ∈ [M
L, M
S], inflation is between 
the critical rates π
L and π
S, so that nominal rigidity is binding in at least one sector, while   22
unemployment takes an intermediate value, between u
S and u
L.  (McDonald, 1995) 
surveys other theories of a range of equilibria.)  
6 Simulation  results 
Proposition 4 above establishes the existence of the long run trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment. Moreover, a comparison with Proposition 3 shows that the 
possibility of holdout threats and the existence of firing costs hold the key to the long run 
effects of monetary policy. However, the practical importance of these results depends on 
the quantitative effects; this is the topic of the numerical simulations presented in this 
section. Here I also allow for additional features that are not included in the theoretical 
model. First, productivity growth leads to growth in real wages, allowing for growth in 
nominal wages even at constant nominal prices. I include annual labour productivity 
growth at a rate α = 0.02. Second, there is heterogeneity at industry/firm level, involving 
changes in relative wages: I distinguish five groups within each sector, unionised and 
non-unionised, and add a group-specific stochastic term (standard error 0.01) to the 
bargaining outcome except in the holdout cases (cf appendix).  
  Figure 2 shows the trade-off between inflation and unemployment in the form of a 
long-run Phillips curve under the basis simulation (see also Table 1, column 2). While I 
have tried to choose parameter values that are plausible for most European countries, the 
highly stylised nature of the model implies that the position of the Phillips curve, as well 
as the entries in Table 1, should only be considered as illustrative. 
  According to the basis simulation, inflation can be reduced down to 1.9 percent 
on annual basis with only a small increase in unemployment, from 6.5 to 6.7 percent. 
However, a further reduction in inflation involves a larger increase in unemployment, by   23
almost 1/2 percentage points (to 6.9 percent) at inflation of 1.4 percent, and by 2.5 
percentage point (to 9.2 percent) at 1 percent inflation. Absolute price stability - zero 
inflation - involves in increase in unemployment of more than 3.5 percentage points, up 
to 10.2 percent. (Incidentally, Lundborg and Sacklèn, 2001, find in a study of Sweden for 
the period 1963 - 2000 that a reduction in inflation from about 2 1/2 percent to zero is 
associated with an increase in unemployment of more than two percentage points.) 
  The remaining columns in Table 1 show the results of variation in some of the 
parameter values. The third to fifth columns show that the size of the unionised sector (γ) 
has fairly small effect for moderate and high levels of inflation, even a dramatic reduction 
in coverage of collective agreements from a stylised European country (the base case, γ = 
0.75) to a stylised US type of economy (γ = 0.15), combined with imposing employment 
at-will outside the union sector (allowing for a small cost associated with cutting wages, 
eg related to fairness, etc. so that z = 0.01), only reduces unemployment by about 1 
percentage point if inflation is 2.5 percent or above. However, for very low rates of 
inflation the difference is much greater - at zero inflation unemployment is more than 4 
percent higher in the stylised European base case than in the US type economy. In fact, 
negative inflation involves only a relatively small increase in unemployment in the US 
type economy, reflecting the small size of the union sector.  
  The consequences of price stability or negative inflation increase dramatically if a 
lock-out is very costly or difficult for the employer (the λ
L = 0.8 column). This may be a 
plausible feature of several southern European countries where the law puts severe 
restrictions to firms' use of lock-out (in contrast to the situation in the US and the UK).    24
  Setting nominal wage growth under holdout threats to zero, (κ = 0), moves the 
Phillips curve downwards, implying that inflation can be pushed down to minus 1.5 
percent without much increase in unemployment. This illustrates that the extent to which 
unions can use non-strike industrial action to push up nominal wages is a crucial factor 
when evaluating the implications of price stability.  
  Productivity growth is another key factor, as it in the long run has a direct one-
for-one effect on the vertical position of the Phillips curve. With no productivity growth, 
α = 0, unemployment increases significantly for inflation rates below 3.4 percent, and 
even 1.9 percent inflation involves a rise in unemployment of almost 4 percentage points. 
  The right column (EMU) captures one of the additional problems by pursuing a 
common monetary policy in a Monetary Union. Here, the entries show the average rate of 
unemployment for 12 base case countries, where persistent country-specific annual 
money shocks are added to the common union money stock. As the Phillips curve is 
convex for inflation rates above 1 percent (cf Figure 2), the existence of demand shocks 
inducing variability in inflation rates across countries raises union-wide unemployment 
within this range. Now, 1.9 percent inflation involves 0.5 percentage points higher 
unemployment than for inflation above 3.9 (7.1 versus 6.6), while 1.4 percent inflation 
increases unemployment by another 0.7 percentage point, to 7.8 percent. 
  Table 2 presents the proportion of nominal wage cuts under different rates of 
inflation. The numbers should only be taken as an illustration, as they clearly hinge on 
fairly arbitrary parameter values. Somewhat surprisingly, higher coverage of collective 
agreements increases the proportion of nominal wage cuts under negative inflation. The 
reason is simple, higher coverage also implies higher unemployment and that a larger   25
share of the economy may use inflationary work-to-rule, implying a stronger downward 
pressure on the rest of the economy. Note, however, that adding an idiosyncratic, 
individual-specific component to the wage setting would lead to additional wage cuts, in 
particular in the non-union sector. As expected, weaker employment protection 
legislation, z = 0.01, leads to a higher proportion of nominal wage cuts.  
7 Empirical  relevance   
The model entails a number of predictions that can be tested empirically. First, the model 
predicts that downward nominal wage rigidity exists, but is not absolute (wage cuts do 
occur). This is consistent with the findings of a number of recent studies, for many 
different countries: Fehr and Goette (2000) for Switzerland, Beissinger and Knoppik 
(2000) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2001) for Germany, Dessy (1999) for Italy (as 
reported in Kramarz, 2001) Christofides and Leung (1999), and Fortin and Dumont 
(2000) for Canada, Holden (1998) for the manufacturing sectors in the Nordic countries, 
Agell and Lundborg (1999) for Sweden, Kimura and Ueda (1997) for Japan, Nickell and 
Quintini (2001) for the UK, and Altonji and Devereux (1999) and Lebow et al (2000) for 
the US (the latter three papers also discuss previous empirical findings for the UK and the 
US). In general these studies find (i) a spike in the distribution of nominal wage changes 
at zero and (ii) that the rate of inflation affects the distribution of nominal wage changes. 
These findings are consistent with the model here, but not with standard models with 
overlapping wage contracts where the rate of inflation per se is irrelevant. 
Secondly, the model predicts that, cet. par., downward nominal rigidity is likely to 
be stronger the higher the coverage of collective agreements and the more strict the 
employment protection legislation. The stronger rigidity under collective agreements do   26
not prevent nominal wage cuts from taking place, but it entails that higher unemployment 
is required. Regrettably, different methods and data in the above-mentioned studies make 
it difficult to compare the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity across countries. 
However, the studies nevertheless indicate that money wage rigidity is stronger in 
Sweden and Italy than in the UK and the US, precisely in line with this prediction, in 
light of the much stronger employment protection legislation and higher coverage rates of 
collective agreements in Sweden and Italy. Bewley (1999, table 11.1) find in a survey of 
businesses in the Northeast of the US that 10 percent of the businesses had a cut in the 
base pay for some or all employees during the recession in the early 1990s. In contrast, 
Agell and Lundborg (1999), based on survey evidence among managers in Swedish firms 
with a total of 187 000 employees, find that nominal wage cuts were virtually absent in 
the 1990s, in spite of soaring unemployment and several years with close to zero 
inflation. Note, however, that the fact that downward nominal rigidity is found also in 
countries with weak legal protection of workers' nominal wages, as in the US and 
Switzerland, suggests that also fairness considerations are of importance. 
Third, the model predicts that low inflation is associated with lower output and 
employment in many European countries, but less so in the US. This prediction is 
consistent with evidence in Bullard and Keating (1995). Studying the long run 
relationship between inflation and output in 58 countries over the period 1960-90, 
Bullard and Keating find 16 countries that have experienced permanent shocks to both 
inflation and the level of output. Of these 16 countries, Bullard and Keating find a 
positive and significant long-run response of the level of real output to a permanent 
inflation shock for the four European countries with the lowest rates of inflation   27
(Germany, Austria, Finland and the UK, neglecting Cyprus where the positive coefficient 
is insignificant due to a very large confidence interval). However, for the US, which 
incidentally also had low inflation, the permanent shock to inflation had no significant 
permanent effect on output (the point estimate being close to zero).  
8 Concluding  remarks 
Recent empirical studies have shown substantial evidence of downward nominal wage 
rigidity in a number of OECD countries. Drawing upon earlier work by MacLeod and 
Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1994), I show that this can be explained by the 
institutional feature of European labour markets that nominal wages are a part of a 
contract, either a collective agreement or an individual employment contract, and can as 
such only be changed by mutual consent. This legal feature implies that workers have a 
strategic advantage in the wage negotiations when they try to prevent a cut in nominal 
wages. The upshot is a long run trade-off between inflation and unemployment, where 
very low or negative inflation is associated with higher unemployment.
  
The analysis shows that workers protected by collective agreements or strict 
employment protection legislation are in a stronger position when trying to prevent 
nominal wage cuts, implying that that the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity is 
related to the coverage of collective agreements and the strictness of the employment 
protection legislation. This prediction is consistent with empirical evidence that 
downward nominal wage rigidity is much stronger in Sweden and Italy than in the UK 
and the US. 
To illustrate the macroeconomics implications of these features, the model is used 
for simple numerical illustrations. Given the stylised nature of the model, the results   28
should only be considered indicative. The numerical simulations suggest that even in a 
typical European economy, with high coverage of collective agreements and some 
employment protection legislation, annual inflation can in normal times be kept as low as 
2 - 2.5 percent with negligible costs in the form of additional unemployment. For lower 
rates of inflation, downward nominal rigidity may bind in parts of the labour market, 
leading to stronger wage pressure and higher unemployment. In times of low productivity 
growth, downward nominal wage rigidity may be binding for higher rates of inflation, 
and even 2 percent inflation may involve a considerable increase in unemployment. In 
contrast, in countries with lower bargaining coverage, and much weaker employment 
protection legislation, inflation may even be set to zero with only limited increase in 
unemployment (A caveat to this conclusion is that fairness considerations may limit 
nominal wage cuts, so that low inflation may lead to higher unemployment also here). 
In the European Monetary Union, an additional problem may occur due to 
asymmetric shocks. For inflation rates for which nominal rigidities bind in parts of the 
labour market, the long run Phillips curve is convex, implying that asymmetric shocks 
involve a worsening of the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In this case 
countries experiencing a positive nominal demand shock will have higher inflation, with 
little reduction in unemployment, whereas countries experiencing a negative nominal 
demand shock will have higher unemployment with little reduction in unemployment. A 
consequence of this is that additional unemployment may occur for somewhat higher 
rates of inflation than if the monetary policy could be set specifically for each country. 
The costs associated with higher unemployment under very low inflation will 
clearly induce changes in the way labour markets operate. One would expect pay systems   29
to become more flexible, for example by more extensive use of bonus systems (leading to 
a reduction in the nominal wage increase under holdouts, κ), which would mitigate the 
inflation bias. One would also expect more use of temporary employments contracts 
(Holden, 2001), a tendency that has taken place in many European countries over the last 
decades. However, it is difficult to predict how far-reaching the changes will be. As 
observed above, the legal rule that contract renegotiations require mutual consent plays 
an important role in ensuring efficient investments. Furthermore, restrictions on the 
employer’s right to unilaterally cut nominal wages seem a key ingredient if employment 
protection legislation is to be effective. Thus, proposals for changes in labour laws are 
likely to be met by strong resistance by unions and insiders.  
The key alternative explanation of downward nominal wage rigidity is fairness 
considerations. In my view, these two explanations should be seen as complementary 
rather than alternative. In particular, it seems plausible that they may strengthen each 
other in the sense that the existence of both makes either more persistent: The fact that 
many labour market participants find nominal wage cuts unfair may also contribute to the 
continued existence of legal protection of nominal wages. The legal protection of 
nominal wages makes wage cuts rare even in a low-inflation environment, thus 
preventing Gordon’s (1996) argument that the fairness considerations will be undermined 
by wage cuts being “too common”. The extensive downward nominal wage rigidity in 
Sweden and Switzerland documented by Agell and Lundborg (1999) and Fehr and Goette 
(2000), even after years of close to zero inflation and high unemployment, also show that 
rigidities may be highly persistent. 
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Appendix 
Derivation of (11), the outcome of the wage bargaining during a holdout 
The real wage outcome under holdout threats is given by (as noted below, the limit case 
of the Rubinstein model corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution) 
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the Nash bargaining solution (17) reads (omitting subscript indicating firm) 
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The first order condition can be rearranged to 
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which can be reduced to (11) (invoking the same linear approximations).  QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
To find the SPE outcome, we must analyse the game backwards. As of step 3, we have 
the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) show 
that in the limit when the time delay between offers converges to zero, the outcome is   31
given by the Nash bargaining solution (assuming for simplicity that players have equal 
discount factors). If a work stoppage is initiated, the bargaining outcome is given by 
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Substituting out for (9) and (10), the first order condition can be solved for  
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Consider now the choice of the parties whether to initiate a work stoppage in step 1 or 2. 
Clearly, no party will initiate a work stoppage, leading to a costly dispute, if he/she can 
obtain higher payoff by renegotiation under a holdout. To formalise this intuition, define 
two critical values ω
L and ω
S for the real wage outcome by the following equations  
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The firm can obtain a payoff λ
FΠ(k




L, the firm obtains at least as high profits by a holdout leading to a new 
agreement on (1+κ)W
U




S, the union obtains at least as high utility from a holdout as from 
initiating a work stoppage. From the fact that ∂Π/∂(Wj/P) < 0, ∂U/∂(Wj /P) > 0 and λ
U, λ
F 
< 1, it is immediate that ω
S < k
BR < ω
L for all R.   32
Let me then prove that ω
L and ω





To show this, note that substituting out for Π using (9), (21) can be solved for 
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To verify the same property for ω
S, substitute out for (10) in (22) to obtain (ω
S-R)(ω
S)





-η. Dividing by R
1-η, we obtain ((ω
S/R)-1)(ω
S/R)





which determines a unique value for (ω
S/R) in the appropriate interval for ω
S/R (which is 
(1, ν)), validating the assumption that ω
S is a linear function of R, ω
S = k
SR. 
I now complete the proof by sketching the equilibrium path. (It is straightforward 
to show that a deviation would hurt the deviator.) 
Case (i), The firm offers k
SR, which is immediately accepted by the union.  
Case (ii), Any offer different from (1+κ)W
U
-1/P is rejected, with no work stoppage. 
Case (iii), There are two alternative equilibrium paths, leading to the same outcome. One 
path is that the firm offers k
LR, which the union accepts. The other is that the firm offers 
less, is rejected by the union, and then the union offers k
LR which the firm accepts. QED 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The real wages in the two sectors are found by inserting u
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-η(M/P). To find the 
equilibrium value for the real money stock, we substitute out for sectoral employment in 
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Rearranging, we find the equilibrium real money stock as  
(24) 
η η ν γ ν γ
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It follows that the equilibrium price level is homogenous of degree one in the nominal 
money stock, P = [1/(M/P)
B] M, and so are all other nominal variables. The real variables 
are derived by inserting for (M/P)
B in the relevant expressions. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Part (i): Analogously to the proof of Proposition 3, the equilibrium level of the real 
money stock associated with equilibrium where strike threats and efficiency wages 
prevail, is given by (with obvious notation)  
(25) 
η η ν γ ν γ
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In an equilibrium where strike threats and efficiency wages prevail, the nominal wages in 
the two sectors are functions of the nominal money stock 
(26)  M
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The critical value M















Or, solving for M




















From the definitions of M
S, M
US and M
NS, it is now clear that W







-1 for all M > M
S. Using the results of Propositions 1 and 2, this implies that 
strike threats and efficiency wages prevail if M > M
S, which again implies (as derived in 
the main text) that u = u
S. The minimum associated rate of inflation, π
S, is then given by 
π
S = P/P-1 –1 = [1/(M/P)
S] M
S/P-1 – 1. This completes the proof of part (i). 




and replace superscript S with superscript L, and superscript E with superscript Z, in 
equations (26) – (31)). We then find that W






-1 for all M < 
M
L. π
L is given analogously to π
S, by π
L  = [1/(M/P)
L] M
L/P-1 – 1. 
Part (ii): As inflation is increasing monotonically in M, it follows that π is in the interval 
[π
L, π
S], for all M satisfying M
L ≤ M ≤ M
S. From the proofs of part (i) and (iii), it also 
follows that holdout threats prevail in at least one sector. The contention that  ] , [
L S u u u∈  
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-1 so that holdout threats does not apply in either sector. QED 
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Numerical simulations 
 
The numerical simulations are done in the Nonlinear application in Gauss, based on the 
following equations (firms i =1-5 are unionised, 6-10 non-unionised).  
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In the EMU simulation, (47) and (48) replace (46) to give the nominal money stock, and 
(31)-(45), (46)-(46) are solved for 12 different countries. 
 
To ensure that the shock to relative wages,  i d
~
, is basically exactly that, I use an auxiliary 
variable  i d ˆ  which is independently and normally distributed with zero expectation and 
variance 0.01. Then, I define the average shock ∑ =
i i d d ˆ
10
1
, and let  d d d i i − = ˆ ~
. 
 
To avoid noise arising from stochastic wage setting and initial conditions, I let the 
economy run for 55 periods, with an exogenous money growth rate g that determines the 
rate of inflation. The entries in Table 1 are the average rate of unemployment over the 
last 50 periods. In the EMU simulations, the entry is the average for all 12 countries. 
 
To calculate the proportion of nominal wage cuts, I define a dummy variable Di = 1 if  
W it-1
 > Wit, i = 1, 2, 3 .. 10, and then calculate the proportion of wage cuts as  
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Figure 2 Simulation in Gauss. For parameter values, see basis case in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Long run unemployment rates for different rates of inflation 






-0.020 0.106 0.091 0.076 0.063 0.143 0.095 0.110 0.107 
-0.015 0.104 0.086 0.069 0.061 0.141 0.069 0.109 0.104 
-0.010 0.103 0.085 0.067 0.060 0.140 0.067 0.109 0.103 
-0.005 0.102 0.084 0.066 0.059 0.140 0.066 0.109 0.102 
0.000 0.102 0.083 0.066 0.059 0.138 0.065 0.106 0.095 
0.005 0.099 0.083 0.065 0.058 0.137 0.065 0.104 0.093 
0.010 0.092 0.076 0.062 0.056 0.128 0.066 0.103 0.086 
0.014 0.069 0.062 0.055 0.052 0.077 0.066 0.102 0.078 
0.019 0.067 0.061 0.054 0.052 0.070 0.065 0.102 0.071 
0.025 0.066 0.060 0.054 0.051 0.067 0.065 0.100 0.069 
0.029 0.066 0.060 0.054 0.052 0.065 0.065 0.091 0.067 
0.034 0.066 0.060 0.054 0.051 0.066 0.065 0.069 0.067 
0.039 0.065 0.060 0.054 0.051 0.066 0.065 0.067 0.066 
The first column shows the rate of inflation, the other columns the associated rates of 
unemployment. Basis simulation: η = 3, γ = 0.75, λ
S=0.97, λ
L = 0.9 (this implies that k
S = 
1.076 and k
L = 1.137) , φ=0.3, 1/ν =0.68, B=0.3, k
E = 1.05, z=0.03,κ = 0.03,  σ = 1.8, 
productivity growth α = 0.02. The other columns show effect of deviation indicated in the 
top row. For λ
L = 0.8, we get k
L = 1.206. The different inflation rates are generated by 
different exogenously chosen money growth rates, where the inflation rate is 
approximately the money growth rate minus productivity growth. 
 
Table 2: Proportion of nominal wage cuts for different rates of inflation 






-0.020 0.390 0.290 0.194 0.371 0.425 0.048 0.933 0.491 
-0.015 0.270 0.178 0.095 0.210 0.271 0.003 0.875 0.283 
-0.010 0.174 0.128 0.061 0.102 0.166 0.001 0.791 0.221 
-0.005 0.072 0.056 0.024 0.033 0.084 0.000 0.600 0.180 
0.000 0.037 0.016 0.006 0.021 0.024 0.000 0.383 0.082 
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.261 0.046 
0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.156 0.031 
0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.004 
0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.001 
0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.001 
0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
See table 1. 